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Abstract. The focus of the current research is to identify people of interest in
social networks. We are especially interested in studying dark networks, which
represent illegal or covert activity. In such networks, people are unlikely to dis-
close accurate information when queried. We present REDLEARN, an algorithm
for sampling dark networks with the goal of identifying as many nodes of interest
as possible. We consider two realistic lying scenarios, which describe how indi-
viduals in a dark network may attempt to conceal their connections. We test and
present our results on several real-world multilayered networks, and show that
REDLEARN achieves up to a 340% improvement over the next best strategy.
Keywords: multilayered networks, sampling methods, lying scenarios, nodes of
interest
1 Introduction and Motivation
The advent of big data in today’s complex environment requires decision makers to act
in an overwhelmingly rich environment (or network) based on partial information of
that network. Using an observed portion of some network, it is often desirable to make
inferences about which unobserved areas of the network to explore next. Often, it is of
particular interest to locate “people of interest” (POI) residing in these networks. These
individuals may be trying to conceal themselves, or may be protected by others.
Our work was motivated by study of terrorist networks. These networks typically
include several types of relationships connecting people, producing multilayered net-
works where each layer is defined by a different relationship. For example, one of the
networks contains data depicting relationships among terrorists in the ’Noordin Top’
Network in Indonesia, where relationships are organizations these terrorists belong to,
the schools or trainings they went to, kinship, recruiting and so on. The data was col-
lected by Everton et. al [19] and compiled into a network by Gera et al. in [11].
It is generally desired to find those POIs that possess a certain attribute, such as
people who attended a specific planning meeting or who were involved in organizing a
particular attack. For our specific work, in the insurgent network Noordin Top (see Sec-
tion 5.1) all the people that were communicating using a certain medium were tagged as
∗Ralucca Gera would like to thank the DoD for partially sponsoring the current research.
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being POI, producing a relatively small number of POI. We assume that we begin with
knowledge of one POI in the network, with the rest of the network unobserved (both in
terms of topology as well as node attributes). Our goal is to sample the network in such
a way that we observe as many POIs as possible. To our knowledge, we are the first
to consider the problem of sampling with the goal of identifying nodes of interest in a
setting with misinformation.
We present REDLEARN, a novel, learning-based algorithm for sampling networks
with the goal of finding as many POIs as possible. We show that in cases where the POIs
exhibit homophily (i.e., are likely to be connected to other POIs), a simple strategy of
choosing the node with the most POI neighbors works well. However, in the more re-
alistic scenario where POIs hide their connections with other POIs, REDLEARN shows
outstanding performance, beating the next best strategy by up to 340%.
2 Problem Definition
We refer to nodes representing POIs as ‘red’ nodes, and other nodes as ‘blue’, giving us
a purple network. We assume that there is an unobserved, underlying graph G= (V,E),
in which each node v ∈V has color Cv ∈ {red,blue}. We begin with having knowledge
of only one red node in G.
To increase our observation of the network, we place monitors on nodes. A monitor
tells us (1) the true color of the node being placed on, (2) the true neighbors of that node,
and (3) the colors of the node’s neighbors, possibly with inaccuracies. For example,
placing a monitor on a suspected terrorist could represent determining whether that
person is actually a terrorist, determining who his or her e-mail or phone contacts are,
and questioning the individual about whether those neighbors are themselves terrorists.
Naturally, some individuals may lie about the colors of those neighbors.1
We assume that we are given a budget of b monitors, and can place those monitors
on any node that has been observed. In the first step, we must place a monitor on the
initially observed node, because no other nodes were observed. In subsequent steps, we
may place a monitor on any node that has been observed as a neighbor of a previously-
monitored node.
Our goal is to maximize the total number of red nodes observed.
3 Related Work
Our work here is related to work on analyzing dark networks, a special type of social
network [5]. A dark network is network that is illegal and covert [18], whose members
are actively trying to conceal network information even at the expense of efficiency [5],
and the existing connections are used infrequently [18]. Because a dark network is
deceptive by nature, we examine the lying methodologies along with the discovery
methods in looking for the POI.
There are a multitude of sampling techniques for network exploration, including
random walks ([3], [13], [17]), biased random walks ([10]), or walks combined with
1We consider two realistic ’lying scenarios’; these are described in Section 4.2.
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reversible Markov Chains([2]), Bayesian methods([9]), or standard exhaustive search
algorithms like depth-first or breadth-first searches, such as [1, 6, 7, 8, 14]. However,
these methods fail in using discovered knowledge, such as node attributes, effectively.
Various researchers have considered the problem of sampling for specific goals,
such as maximizing the number of nodes observed. For example, Avrachenkov, et al.
present an algorithm to sample the node with the highest estimated unobserved de-
gree [4]. Hanneke and Xing [12], and Maiya and Berger-Wolf [16] examine online
sampling for centrality measures. Macskassy and Provost develop a guilt-by-association
method to identify suspicious individuals in a partially-known network [15].
4 Proposed Method: REDLEARN
A monitor placement strategy is an incremental sampling strategy. In each step, it uses
current knowledge of the discovered graph, including the observed topology of the
graph, known colors of nodes (observed by monitors placed directly on those nodes),
and the stated colors of monitored nodes’ neighbors (i.e., for each neighbor of a moni-
tored node, whether the monitored node said that that neighbor was red or blue). With
this information, the strategy determines where to place the next monitor to discover
the most number of red nodes. This continues until the monitor budget is exhausted.
monitored node is a node with a monitor placed on it. A monitored node is known
red (or blue). Recall that a monitored node may lie about its neighbors’ colors; thus the
color of a node is not known with certainty until it is monitored. Let N(v) refer to the
set of neighbors of v.
4.1 Baseline Monitor Placement Strategies
We now describe several natural monitor placement strategies. We use these strategies
as comparison algorithms in our experiments; additionally, some of these strategies are
used in developing our learning strategy REDLEARN.
Smart Random Sampling (SR): In each step, the Smart Random Placement strat-
egy places monitors on a random unmonitored node. Due to the inefficiency of using
no information about the network for monitor placement, this is used as a lower bound
placement strategy for the introduced methodologies.
Red Score (RS): The Red Score strategy is guided by the colors reported by neigh-
bors of a node. If a node v reports its neighbor u as red, the score associated with node
u is increased by one, making it more suspicious. This strategy selects the node with
highest red score to place the next monitor. For this method, the red score is highly
impacted by the accuracy of information given by the neighboring node. Additionally,
due to its use of both red and blue node information, this strategy uses the most amount
of information as compared to the other baseline strategies.
Most Red Say Red (MRSR): The MRSR strategy places a monitor on the node
with the greatest number of red neighbors who report it as a red node. It does not factor
in blue node information and is dependent solely on the accuracy of the information
given by neighboring red nodes. Blue nodes are essentially useless in this strategy,
mimicking the reality when they might not know who the POIs are. This placement
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strategy would result in a red node with no red neighbors being impossible to discover
except by chance.
Most Red Neighbors (MRN): The MRN placement strategy places a monitor on
the node with the most known red neighbors. This strategy ignores what the monitored
nodes say about their neighbors. This strategy would likely work best in a network
with high homophily. Similar to the MRSR strategy, blue neighbors are unimportant in
determining the likelihood of a given node being red.
4.2 REDLEARN: A Learning Based Monitor Placement Strategy
When determining which node v to place the next monitor on, for each candidate node
v (i.e., each observed but unmonitored node), the strategies above consider the colors
of v’s neighbors and/or the color that each of v’s monitored neighbors reported.
Intuitively, if the original network displays homophily, the probability of node v
being a red node is higher if it has many red neighbors. But if the network does not
display homophily, using this measure can result in poor performance. Note that we
expect many dark networks to exhibit low or even anti-homophily, as malicious actors
are likely to go out of their way to conceal their connections.
Additionally, some monitor placement strategies like red score, depend on infor-
mation given by neighbors. The performance of such monitor placement criteria thus
heavily depend on the policies that nodes follow when stating their neighbors’ colors.
To overcome these dependencies, we propose REDLEARN, a learning based monitor
placement strategy. Our goal is to successfully predict the probability of a node v being
red (P(v = R)) based on the observed network structure and what v’s neighbors say
about v. We model this as a two class classification problem, but rather than looking at
the assigned label (Red or Blue), we are more interested in finding P(v=R). Once these
probabilities are determined, REDLEARN places the next monitor on the node with the
highest such probability.
Features: Table 1 describes the set of features used in our learning based moni-
tor placement algorithm. There are two types of features: (a) Network structure-based
features (1,2,3), and (b) Neighbor answer-based features (4,5,6,7,8).
Table 1: Classification features for REDLEARN. Consider a node v with neighbors N(v)
Feature Description
(1) Number of Red Neighbors |{u ∈ N(v)|cu = R}|
(2) Number of Blue neighbors |{u ∈ N(v)|cu = B}|
(3) Number of Red triangles if v is red
∣∣∣∣{u,w ∈ N(v)|u ∈ N(w)∩w ∈ N(u)∩ cu = cw = R}∣∣∣∣
(4) Red score |{u ∈ N(v)|(u says R)}|
(5) Number of Red neighbors saying red |{u ∈ N(v)|(u says R)∩ cu = R}|
(6) Number of red neighbors saying blue |{u ∈ N(v)|(u says B)∩ cu = R}|
(7) Number of blue neighbors saying red |{u ∈ N(v)|(u says R)∩ cu = B}|
(8) Number of blue neighbors saying blue |{u ∈ N(v)|(u says B)∩ cu = B}|
(9) Inferred probability of being red PI(v= R)
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Network structure-based features are used to learn the patterns of connections between
red nodes (e.g., homophily vs. anti-homophily). Neighbor answer-based features are
intended to learn the relationship between what a node says about its neighbors’ colors
and the true colors of those neighbors.
Inferred probability of being red: We formulate four different probabilities to
measure the trustworthiness of colors given by differently colored nodes (i.e., whether
a monitored node lies or is honest about its neighbors’ colors). We use the information
collected prior to placing a monitor on a node to calculate these probabilities. Consider
a node v which was discovered through a monitor placed on node u.
1. P(v= R|(u= R)∧ (u Says R)) = |{(v= R)∩ (u= R)∩ (u says R)}||{(u= R)∩ (u says R)}|
2. P(v= R|(u= R)∧ (u Says B)) = |{(v= R)∩ (u= R)∩ (u says B)}||{(u= R)∩ (u says B}|
3. P(v= R|(u= B)∧ (u Says R)) = |{(v= R)∩ (u= B)∩ (u says R)}||{(u= B)∩ (u says R)}|
4. P(v= R|(u= B)∧ (u Says B)) = |{(v= R)∩ (u= B)∩ (u says B)}||{(u= B)∩ (u says B)}|
Given a node v, we calculate the inferred probability, PI(v= R) using equation 1.
PI(v= R) =
∑u∈N(v)P(v= R|color(u)∧ color(u says v))
|N(v)| (1)
Training Data: Suppose that we have placed n monitors so far. Then the training set
consists of the true colors of the n monitored nodes along with their respective feature
values. To determine where to place the (n+1)st monitor, we train the learning model
using this data.
Classification Algorithm: Our goal is finding P(v= R) for each unmonitored node
v. Because we are predicting a probability rather than a binary label, we propose using a
logistic regression classifier. Furthermore, because the learning model must be updated
frequently, this classifier gives an added advantage of faster training.
Placing the Next Monitor (Prediction): Given the placement of n monitors and
deciding to place the (n+ 1)st monitor, REDLEARN considers all unmonitored nodes
discovered so far. Next, it calculates feature vectors associated with these non monitor
nodes, and applies the classifier to these feature vectors, giving the probability that each
unmonitored node is red. REDLEARN selects the node with the highest probability for
placing the next monitor. Algorithm 1 summarizes REDLEARN.
5 Experimental Set Up
In section 5.1, we give a description of our network datasets, and then consider them
without homophily as described in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we introduce two lying
scenarios to model the lying behavior of a node (i.e., whether it says its neighbors are
red or blue). Finally, we describe our experimental setup.
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Algorithm 1 Learning based monitor placement
procedure LEARNING(start,budget)
G← Graph
G.add(start), G.add(N(start)) . Starting node and neighbors
while budget>0 do
Monitors← list of monitored nodes in G
TrainingData← feature vectors for Monitors
Train classifier using TrainingData
NotMonitors← list of not yet monitored nodes in G
for v ∈ NotMonitors do
Get feature vector for v
P(v=R)← predict v’s probability of Red using learning model
Choose node v with maximum P(v= R) from NotMonitors
budget← (budget−1)
Use v as next monitor
5.1 Datasets
Noordin Top Network: The first network studied is Noordin Top, a relatively small,
but real network with 139 nodes and 1042 edges depicting several types of relation-
ships between them (‘Noordin Top’ is the name of the leader of this network).2 In this
network, every node is a terrorist, and we are interested in identifying those individu-
als that communicate using a certain medium. We consider 5 versions of this network.
In NoordinComs1, the POI (red nodes) are those communicating using a general com-
puter medium; in NoordinComs2, the red nodes are those who communicate using print
media; in NoordinComs3, the red nodes are those who communicate using support ma-
terials; in NoordinComs4, the red nodes are those who communicate using unknown
media; in NoordinComs5, the red nodes are those who communicate using video (Ta-
ble 2).
Table 2: Noordin Top network overview
Network name Red Node Count Degrees of Red Nodes
NoordinComs 1 9 8,12,20,21,33,38,50
NoordinComs 2 5 8,21,38,38,50
NoordinComs 3 9 11,12,21,38,39,50,52
NoordinComs 4 18 17,21,24,27,31,38,40,45,52,53,58
NoordinComs 5 11 0,9,21,33,38,41,50,52
PokeC Network: The PokeC network is part of a Slovenian on-line social network.3
The nodes in the network are users of the social network and edges depicts friendship
relations. Each node has some number of associated user attributes (e.g., age, region,
2Obtained from https://sites.google.com/site/sfeverton18/
research/appendix-1.
3Obtained from http://snap.stanford.edu/data/.
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gender, interests, height etc.). We use a sample of this network containing all nodes in
the region ”kosicky kraj, michalovce” and edges among them. This sampled network
contains 26,220 nodes and 241,600 edges.
We assign node colors based on two different node attributes: age (a node with age
in the range 28-32 is marked red, and blue otherwise, giving 1736 red nodes) and height
(a user of height less than 160 cm is marked red, giving 1668 red nodes).
5.2 Eliminating Homophily
In both networks that we consider, red nodes tend to be connected to each other. How-
ever, in a dark network where red nodes are actively trying to hide their presence, these
nodes would conceal the existence of such connections (for example, instead of using
their normal cell phone to make calls to other red nodes, a red node might use a burner
phone for such calls). To account for this, we consider versions of our datasets where
all connections between red nodes are removed. Note that this type of network presents
a much more challenging setting, as one cannot simply rely on homophily to find red
nodes.
5.3 Lying Scenarios
Recall that a monitor tells us the true color of the monitored node and the possibly
incorrect colors of that node’s neighbors. Because we do not have data describing how
terrorists lie to prevent detection of other terrorists, we must simulate this behavior.
In formulating these lying scenarios, we assume the existence of a hierarchy among
the nodes, where nodes are more likely to lie to protect those above them in the hierar-
chy. We assume that the red nodes are fully aware of the hierarchy, but blue nodes may
or may not be aware, depending on the scenario.
In both lying scenarios, we assume that nodes may lie not only about the color of
red nodes (i.e., lie to protect POIs), but also about the color of blue nodes (i.e., framing
innocent individuals as a distraction). Without this assumption, the problem would be
trivial, because anytime any individual said a node was red, we would know with full
certainty that that node is actually red.
Consider nodes u and v, where u,v ∈ Edges. The probability that u lies about v,
P(u lie v) depends on:
– The color of u (Cu) and color of v (Cv).
– The inherent honesty of u (Hu), where higher H values indicate that u is more
predisposed to telling the truth.
– The hierarchical position of u (Lu) relative to the position of v (Lv).
Suppose u is a red node. In all lying scenarios, the probability that u lies about
another node v is given by the following equations:
Equation 2 determines the probability u will lie about a red node. LvLu indicates how
far above v is in the hierarchy compared to u and 1−Hu is probability that u will lie.
P(u lie v|v= Red) = min{(1−Hu)∗ LvLu ,1} (2)
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Equation 3 defines the probability u will lie about a blue node. This depends on u’s
honesty and is calculated as (1−Hu).
P(u lie v|v= Blue) = (1−Hu) (3)
Now suppose that u is a blue node. u may know nothing about red nodes. This
depends largely on whether the blue nodes are part of the same organization as the
red nodes, but are simply not of interest to the user (e.g., blue and red nodes are all
terrorists, and red nodes represent a subset of interest), or if the blue nodes represent
individuals who are not part of the same organization as the red nodes (e.g., the red
nodes are terrorists in a sea of blue node civilians).
Table 3: Noordin Top network hierarchy assignment
Role Hierarchy score No. of nodes
Strategist 5 10
Commander; Religious Leader 4 23
Trainer/instructor; Bomb maker; Facilitator; Propagandist; Recruiter 3 33
Bomber/fighter; Suicide Bomber; Courier; Recon/Surveillance 2 33
Unknown 1 40
– Lying scenario-1 (LS1): Blue nodes know about red nodes. Here, P(u lie v|u =
Blue,v = Red) is determined using equation 2, since blue nodes know about red
nodes and their hierarchy. Additionally, blue nodes may lie about other blue nodes.
P(u lie v|u= Blue,v= Blue) is thus calculated using equation 3.
– Lying scenario-2(LS2): Blue nodes don’t know about red nodes. Here, blue nodes
will simply say that all their neighbors are blue. Because of this P(u lie v|u =
Blue,v= Blue) = 0 and P(u lie v|u= Blue,v= Red) = 1
In all cases, if P(u lie v) is greater than 1, it is rounded down to 1.
5.4 Experiments
Since our lying scenarios are probabilistic, the colors that nodes say about neighbors can
change from one run of the algorithm to another. Additionally, the honesty assignment
to a node also can change from one run to another. Thus, for each network and lying
scenario, we perform 25 runs of each monitor placement strategy.
In each run, we begin with a randomly selected red node. For a fair comparison
across different monitor placement strategies, we make sure that we run each monitor
placement strategy with the same sets of starting nodes and honesty assignments.
In these experiments, the honesty of a node is drawn from a normal distribution,
h ∼ N (0.5,0.125). In the Noordin Top network, ground truth hierarchy scores are
known, and shown in Table 3. In the PokeC network, we set the hierarchy score to be
the degree of the node. Given a particular lying scenario, a monitored node u lies about
a neighbor v’s color with probability P(u lie v) as given in Section 5.3.
In each run, we consider budgets up to half the number of nodes in the network.
The Noordin Top network is small, and so we retrain REDLEARN after each monitor is
placed. The PokeC network is larger, so for the sake of efficiency, we train the learning
model once per every 20 monitors placed.
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6 Results and Analysis
In this section, we compare the results based on the various monitor placement strate-
gies, and examine how performance is affected by (1) the presence or absence of ho-
mophily, (2) the lying scenario used by the nodes, and (3) the monitor placement budget.
As an example, Figure 1 shows results on the NoordinComs4 network with and
without edges between red nodes, respectively. When there is homophily, the problem
becomes easy, and the simple strategy of monitoring the node with the most red neigh-
bors (MRN) is best. However, note that in both lying scenarios, REDLEARN is close
behind the MRN strategy (because it needs time to train, it doesn’t quite match the
performance of MRN).
Homophily is present (original network)
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(a) LS1: All nodes aware of red nodes.
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(b) LS2: Only red nodes aware of red nodes.
Fig. 1: Comparison of monitor placement strategies on the NoordinComs4 network. The
black line indicates the total number of red nodes present in the network.
However, we see from the bottom figures that when edges between red nodes are
removed, the MRN strategy performs very poorly. In this setting, REDLEARN performs
much better than all comparison methods: it is able to learn the patterns and structural
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characteristics of red nodes, and by incorporating what neighbors say about a node,
achieves strong performance.
Due to space constraints, we summarize results for the other cases in Tables 4 and 5.
We see similar patterns across all networks: when there are edges between red nodes,
it is enough to select the node with the most red neighbors; but when these edges are
concealed, REDLEARN is the clear winner.
Even when there are edges between red nodes, REDLEARN usually achieves per-
formance close to the MRN strategy. There are some exceptions, such as the No-
ordinComs2 network. This typically occurs if there are very few red nodes: for instance,
NoordinComs2, only 5 out of 139 nodes are red. There is simply not enough informa-
tion for REDLEARN to train on.
This analysis shows that performance of the proposed algorithm does not rely on a
particular network structure, or which lying scenario people might use. Therefore using
learning based monitor placement is guaranteed to give better performance, especially
in real networks, which are large.
Table 4: Comparison of the percentage of red nodes found from each monitor placement
strategy. Budgets include Low (10% of the nodes), Medium (25% of the nodes), and
High (50% of the nodes). These networks exhibit homophily: edges between red nodes
have not been removed.
(a) Lying Scenario 1
Low Budget Medium Budget High Budget
Network/
Strategy RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR
NrdnComs1 28 74 97 52 32 43 97 100 77 51 97 100 100 92 75
NrdnComs2 42 37 62 48 42 61 72 100 72 55 99 93 100 91 81
NrdnComs3 33 63 83 52 27 59 89 100 77 46 100 100 100 97 73
NrdnComs4 54 60 70 66 28 63 98 100 90 48 100 100 100 100 76
NrdnComs5 34 67 84 52 32 43 91 91 75 46 88 91 91 86 67
PokeC age 5 14 22 20 7 15 43 47 39 21 48 73 68 62 47
PokeC height 14 14 21 23 11 36 32 48 47 28 74 64 73 69 54
(b) Lying Scenario 2
Low Budget Medium Budget High Budget
Network/
Strategy RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR
NrdnComs1 57 78 89 57 33 82 100 100 79 47 96 100 100 95 73
NrdnComs2 56 54 83 55 38 83 66 99 82 52 94 89 100 94 74
NrdnComs3 50 70 76 52 34 77 85 100 80 50 99 97 100 99 77
NrdnComs4 68 62 74 67 28 92 100 100 91 50 98 100 100 97 79
NrdnComs5 59 64 88 59 32 79 91 91 79 50 89 91 91 90 74
PokeC age 20 12 22 19 7 39 33 47 39 21 62 60 68 62 46
PokeC height 23 12 21 23 12 46 29 48 46 28 69 62 73 69 54
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Table 5: Comparison of the percentage of red nodes found from each monitor placement
strategy. Budgets include Low (10% of the nodes), Medium (25% of the nodes), and
High (50% of the nodes). These networks do not exhibit homophily among the red
nodes: edges between red nodes have been removed.
(a) Lying Scenario 1
Low Budget Medium Budget High Budget
Network/
Strategy RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR
NrdnComs1 16 33 12 14 22 38 46 20 27 36 72 64 40 48 58
NrdnComs2 30 70 21 26 35 50 82 26 41 55 86 94 52 63 84
NrdnComs3 21 59 12 14 22 57 82 16 28 44 76 99 41 57 76
NrdnComs4 12 30 6 8 12 31 52 11 15 28 53 67 28 38 47
NrdnComs5 13 35 10 11 16 30 51 12 18 26 52 55 28 34 40
PokeC age 5 13 5 6 7 14 34 16 18 20 43 59 39 41 44
PokeC height 13 14 5 7 11 33 33 15 19 27 69 59 37 44 52
(b) Lying Scenario 2
Low Budget Medium Budget High Budget
Network/
Strategy RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR RS RDLRN MRN MRSR SR
NrdnComs1 14 33 12 14 22 21 53 19 24 41 53 64 40 48 63
NrdnComs2 26 58 22 25 37 40 70 26 35 54 68 83 54 70 84
NrdnComs3 15 64 12 16 23 26 85 17 23 38 54 98 41 57 70
NrdnComs4 8 35 7 8 15 15 59 10 15 27 38 66 26 35 50
NrdnComs5 9 39 9 11 18 16 47 13 17 27 33 53 27 35 42
PokeC age 6 10 5 6 7 16 26 14 16 18 42 59 39 41 44
PokeC height 6 12 5 7 10 19 28 15 19 26 43 58 37 43 52
7 Conclusions and Further Directions
Members of dark networks conceal information by nature, and while deceptive and
sparse, they are still structured. Based on these properties, we created and analyzed the
results of several methods of sampling the networks to identify POI (red nodes). We
developed a variety of natural sampling methods, and tested them both on a small real
terrorist network as well as a larger social network.
We then created REDLEARN, a learning-based method for locating People of Inter-
est in dark networks. REDLEARN uses features from the simpler methods and learns
how to identify red nodes in networks. We showed that REDLEARN outperforms the
other methods in cases where one cannot rely on homophily to identify red nodes.
In our future work, one interesting direction is to consider the dynamicity of the
network (both on the edge and node rate of birth and retirement), as well as a more
sophisticated model of the concealed nodes and relationships.
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